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THE AMERICAN MILITIA AND THE ORIGIN 
OF CONSCRIPTION: A REASSESSMENT 
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel*
Author’s Introduction: I originally completed this article in 1986, but it 
appeared only in an obscure, now-defunct (I believe) libertarian publication, 
Rampart Individualist 4 (Summer 1988). I have long intended to revise it 
for some more prominent forum, but have never found the time. I offer it 
again, with only slight stylistic revision, because of the recent public ation 
of Michael A. Bellesiles’s controversial book, Arming America: The Origins 
of a National Gun Culture.1 Bellesiles’s most arresting claim, and the one 
for which he has drawn the most criticism, is that very few Americans owned 
firearms prior to the Civil War. In reaching this conclusion, Bellesiles makes 
some equally dubious assertions about the insignificance and incompetence 
of the American militia of the era. His denigration flies in the face of what 
military historians, whatever their ideological inclinations, have long known 
about the pervasive historical role and operations of the militia. Thus, I pre­
sent this article as a mild corrective. If I were to revise it, I would primarily 
take notice of many of the relevant books and articles that have appeared in 
the intervening fifteen years. But very few of the scholarly gaps in the litera­
ture I identified then have yet been fully filled, and almost none of my overall 
conclusions require the slightest modific ation. 
According to established mythology, American citizens were not 
conscripted until the Civil War. First the Confederacy and then the 
Union resorted to the draft to fill their depleting armies. Prior to that, 
this mythology holds, no draft existed in the United States. The U.S. 
government fought the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and 
the Mexican War solely with volunteers. Toward the end of the War 
of 1812, the Madison administration did call for conscription, but this 
* Adjunct Associate Professor, Departments of Economics and History, Gol­
den Gate University, and a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution. 
1Michael A. Bellesiles, Arming America: The Origins of a National Gun Cul­
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request failed due to Daniel Webster’s stirring and frequently reprinted 
denunciation of the draft on the floor of Congress.2 
Unfortunately, this halcyon portrait is false in nearly every respect. 
The only U.S. war fought without conscripts before the Civil War was 
the Mexican War. American governments, state or national, drafted 
men not only to fight the Revolution and the War of 1812, but also to 
wage Indian wars and to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion. Because 
they employed decentralized militia drafts, however, this fact has of­
ten escaped notice. Military experts privy to the compulsory nature 
of the militia and the implications of such arcane phrases as “calling 
forth the militia” have failed to communicate their knowledge to out­
siders. Indeed, the militia’s coercive elements lasted until they were 
discontinued during the Jacksonian era.3 
2As reputable and able an authority on conscription as Martin Anderson, who 
served on President Reagan’s Military Manpower Task Force, appears to hold 
to aspects of this mythology. His works on the subject include a bibliography 
he compiled with Valerie Bloom—Conscription: A Select and Annotated 
Bibliography (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1967)—plus two 
collections he edited: The Military Draft: Selected Readings on Conscription 
(Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), with Barbara Honegger; 
and Registration and the Draft: Proceedings of the Hoover-Rochester Confer­
ence on the All-Volunteer Force (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 
1982). Although Anderson has not written personally on conscription’s his­
tory, he included on the inside covers of The Military Draft  a historical chart 
which conforms to this mythology. From the same volume, his editorial in­
troduction to William G. Carleton’s “Rais ing A rmies Before the Civil War,” 
pp. 67–78, evinces a similar historical view. Incidentally, although Anderson 
selected this article to survey American conscription during the pre-Civil War 
period, it really says very little about that subject, being actually concerned 
with the question of regulars versus federal volunteers, two different types 
of voluntarily recruited soldiers. See n. 28 below. 
3The scholarly literature could very fruitfully accommodate another history of 
the American militia and another history of conscription in the United States. 
The most recent account of the origin and development of state military 
forces is John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the N ational Guard 
(New York: Macmillan, 1983). It offers the most complete enumeration 
available of instances in which a militia draft was employed, but overall, 
unfortunately, it is not quite up to the standards of thoroughness set by its 
companion volumes in the Macmillan Wars of the United States s eries, or 
by the author’s previous work. 
Still less helpful are the two older histories of the militia: William H. 
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Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957); and Jim Dan 
Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard 
(Harrisburg, Penn.: Stackpole, 1964). Riker’s book offers interesting statis­
tics, but it is brief, and it slights the volunteer militia. Hill’s book, on the 
other hand, takes a narrative approach that emphasizes the volu nteer militia, 
but devotes only one of its twenty-one chapters to the pre-Civil War period. 
Likewise, Eileen Galloway, History of United States Military Policy on Re­
serve Forces, 1775–1957, Paper No. 17, prepared for the House Armed 
Services Committee, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957, can only be cursory in its 
mere fifty-seven pages. 
Although a collection of documents, John O’Sullivan and Allan M. Meck­
ler, ed., The Draft and Its Enemies: A Documentary History (Urbana: Uni­
versity of Illinois Press, 1974), provides in its textual introduction and notes 
the best—indeed, nearly the only—general history of conscription in the 
United States. It incorporates more fully than any other work on the subject 
an awareness of the militia's coercive nature. A neglected but extremely well­
informed summary that covers this topic through the end of the Civil War is 
William L. Shaw, “Conscription by the State through the Time of the Civil 
War,” Judge Advocate Journal, no. 34 (October 1962), pp. 1–40. Also helpful 
as to the history of the draft, despite having little on the militia, are two ar­
ticles by Cotton M. Lindsay, “Our National Tradition of Conscription: The 
Early Years” and “Our National Tradition of Conscription: Experience with 
the Draft,” in Why the Draft? The Case for a Volunteer Army , ed. James C. 
Miller, III (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968), pp. 107–45. 
Much sketchier is John L. Rafuse, “United States’ Experience with 
Volunteer and Conscript Forces,” in Studies Prepared for the President’s 
Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1970), vol. 2. Joseph C. Duggan’s published 
dissertation, The Legislative and Statutory Development of the Federal 
Concept of Conscription for Military Service (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1964), is weak on the antebellum period. John 
Remington Graham, A Constitutional History of the Military Draft  (Min­
neapolis: Ross & Hainers, 1971), is a brief but reliable overview, despite its 
partisan objection to conscription’s constitutionality. Jack Franklin Leach, 
Conscription in the United States: Historical Background (Rutland, Ve r­
mont: Charles E. Tuttle, 1952), really only covers the efforts for conscrip­
tion at the national level during the War of 1812 and the Civil War. 
Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobili­
zation in the United States Army, 1775–1945 (Washington, D.C.: Depart­
ment of the Army, 1955), surveys the history of U.S. manpower mobiliza­
tion in general. A magisterial work from the Macmillan Wars of the United 
States series that places the history of U.S. conscription into a broad context 
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THE COLONIAL PERIOD AND 

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 

The militia system was originally transplanted to the American 
colonies from England.4 At the outset, it was grounded in the princi­
ple of universal obligation. Practices differed widely from colony to 
colony, but everywhere the militia had two coercive elements. First, 
it enrolled every able-bodied male between certain ages (usually six­
teen to sixty), with only a few exemptions. Colonial governments re­
quired those enrolled to furnish their own arms (no small expense) and 
to muster for regularly scheduled training. Failure to do so resulted in 
fines. Initially, this mandatory training could be as frequent as once 
a week or more, but, as the Indian threat receded, most colonies reduc­
ed the number of training days to approximately four per year. The 
militia thereby provided a compulsory system of universal military 
training. 
The second coercive element evolved when the militia was called 
forth for active military service. Only in dire emergency, and only for 
a short period, would a militia district deploy its enrolled manpower 
in toto. Normally, when a colonial government called upon its mili­
tia for a military campaign, it would set quotas for each district. The 
districts would then try to fill the quotas with volunteers, and some­
times the colonies would encourage volunteering with bounties. How­
ever, if volunteers were insufficient, the districts would then meet 
their quotas through drafts. Generally, the only legal ways of avoid­
ing such militia drafts were by either paying a stiff fine or hiring a sub­
stitute. Thus, the threat of conscription lurked behind every resort to 
the seemingly innocuous power to call out the militia. 
Enforcement of the militia’s coercive elements was sometimes 
lax. Moreover, there were hallowed restrictions upon employment 
of the militia draft. Colonial governments were not supposed to send 
drafted militiamen outside the colony, and the draftee’s term of ser­
vice was usually limited to three months. Consequently, if colonial 
On the English precursor to the American militia system, see Michael Pow­
icke, Military Obligation in Medieval England: A Study in Liberty and Duty 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Lindsay Boynton, The Elizabethan Mili­
tia, 1558–1638 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967); and J.R. Wes t­
ern, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century: The Story of a Political 
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governments planned long, offensive military expeditions, they gen­
erally relied upon militia volunteers who specifically contracted for 
such expeditions. On occasion, some colonies even established quasi­
standing military forces independent of the militia. 
Colonial governments nonetheless made frequent recourse to mili­
tia drafts during the Indian wars and in imperial wars against France 
and Spain. If necessary, they passed special legislation obviating the 
militia draft’s restrictions, or directly impressed men not from the 
militia rolls but from the lower strata of society, as was commonly 
done in Britain. In addition, the militia functioned as a standby local 
police force. (American cities did not establish their first professional 
forces of armed police until the 1850s.) The New England colonies 
merged the militia with the night watch while the Southern colonies as­
signed it the mission of slave patrolling. Governments in every locale 
depended on the militia to suppress insurrections. All such additional 
militia tasks imposed further compulsory duties upon the citizens.5 
5Colonial militias have been well studied. For overviews, see Herbert L. 
Osgood, The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (New York: 
Macmillan, 1904–07), vol. 1, pp. 496–527, vol. 2, pp. 375–400; Louis 
Morton, “The Origins of American Military Policy,” Military Affairs 22 
(Summer 1958), pp. 75–82, reprinted in Anderson, The Military Draft , pp. 
47–58, as well as in Military Analysis of the Revolutionary War: An An­
thology of the Editors of Military Affairs (Millwood, N.Y.: KTO Press, 
1977), pp. 7–14; Daniel Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial Experi­
ence (New York: Random House, 1958), pp. 343–72; John W. Shy, “A 
New Look at the Colonial Militia,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 
20 (April 1963), pp. 175–85, reprinted and slightly revised in  A People 
Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American 
Independence, ed. John W. Shy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 
pp. 21–33, and also reprinted in The Military in America: From the Colonial 
Era to the Present, ed. Peter Karsten (New York: Free Press, 1980), pp. 3–12; 
Douglas Edward Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British 
Colonies in North America, 1607–1763 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 
1–41; and Darrett B. Rutman, A Militant New World, 1607–1640 (New York: 
Arno Press, 1979), a reprint of his 1959 Ph.D. dissertation for the University 
of Virginia. 
These works, along with Mahon’s  History of the Militia, pp. 14–34, and 
Russell F. Weigley’s  History of the United States Army  (New York: Macmil­
lan, 1967), pp. 3–12, lead us to more specialized journal articles and disser­
tations which cover the militia of nearly every colony. Three especially note­
worthy colony studies are David William Cole, “The Organization and Ad­
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Within this fundamentally coercive system, a volunteer component 
did emerge. Alongside the common militia, just described, was what 
came to be called the volunteer militia, consisting of privately recruited 
military units. The earliest such unit was the Ancient and Honorable 
Artillery Company of Boston, organized in 1636 and still in existence. 
At first, these volunteer units were completely independent of the com­
mon militia. Later, colonial governments and successor state govern­
ments integrated them into the general militia systems. Volunteer units 
provided much of the cavalry, artillery, and elite infantry within the 
militia. Men could gain exemption from the common militia by join­
ing a volunteer unit. But many of these units still remained private 
fraternities with exclusive memberships. Furthermore, the total num­
ber and aggregate size of such units remained relatively small for most 
of the eighteenth century.6 
University of South Carolina, 1953); William L. Shea, The Virginia Militia 
in the Seventeenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1983); and Fred Anderson, A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and 
Society in the Seven Years’ War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1984). 
For a compilation of each of the various colonies’ coercive militia enact­
ments, see U.S. Selective Service System,  Backgrounds of Selective Service, 
Special Monograph No. 1, vol. 2, Military Obligation: The American Tradi­
tion (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947). Although 
this compilation is very close to comprehensive, covering the years up to 1789 
and consisting of fourteen parts, each a separate volume, Charles A. Lofgren, 
in “Compulsory Military Service Under the Constitution: The Original Un­
derstanding,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 33 (January 1976), p. 78, 
n. 56, reports that the compilation omits some acts. 
Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in 
American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Caro­
lina Press, 1982), pp. 3–14, provides an excellent intellectual, as o pposed to 
institutional, survey of the colonial militia tradition. Cress, however, exa gger­
ates the extent to which eighteenth-century colonial reliance upon volunteer 
military expeditions represented a straying from that tradition. 
The colonial militia’s role in law enforcement could stand more scrutiny. 
David R. Johnson’s  American Law Enforcement: A History (St. Louis: Forum 
Press, 1981), pp. 1–16, summarizes what we know about colonial law en­
forcement, including the compulsory night watch, but does not d evelop the 
association with the colonial militia system. 
The formation of volunteer units is one aspect of the colonial militia that 
could stand further investigation. Because many such units began as offi­
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Everything noted so far about the compulsory nature of the colo­
nial common militia is well known. Less well known is the fact that 
the common militia persisted without serious alteration through the 
Revolution. As the colonies made the revolutionary transition to states, 
they refurbished their militias to better maintain order, fight the Brit­
ish, and suppress Tories. The new militia systems, however, incorpo­
rated both of the old system’s coercive elements. Even before the Bat­
tles of Lexington and Concord, the colonies increased the number of 
required training days, tightened exemption lists, and stiffened fines. In 
Frederick County, Virginia, during the spring of 1775, for instance, the 
patriot committee increased the frequency of mandatory training days 
for every male between sixteen and sixty to one per month. Compul­
sory militia preparations of this sort were far more widespread than 
their own rare and scattered unit histories—when they can be traced at all. 
For instance, the definitive work on the Ancient and Honorable Artillery 
Company, originally named the “Military Company of Massachusetts,” is 
Oliver A. Roberts, History of the Military Company of Massachusetts Now 
Called the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company of Massachusetts, 
1637–1888, 4 vols. (Boston: A. Mudge & Son, 1895–1901). 
General treatments of the volunteer militia that only touch lightly upon its 
colonial origins are Frederick P. Todd, “Our National Guard: An Introduc­
tion to its History,” Military Affairs 5 (Summer 1941), pp. 73–86; John K. 
Mahon, The American Militia: Decade of Decision, 1789–1800 (Gaines­
ville: University of Florida Press, 1960), pp. 56–61; and Marcus Cunliffe, 
Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775–1865 (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1968), pp. 213–54. Mahon uses the term “special militia” to 
differentiate between independent units formally outside the militia system, 
and volunteer units formally within it. He admits, however, that “the volu n­
teer companies were more intimately related to the independent companies 
than to the standing [i.e., common] militia” (p. 60), and that “in the last dec­
ade of the eighteenth century the distinction between [independent and vol­
unteer units] grew more and more hazy” (p. 61). 
We should further note that because the militia system provided for two 
distinct routes for volunteering, further ambiguity can cloud understanding of 
the term. The description “volunteer” applied not only to members of stand­
ing independent and volunteer militia units, but also to war volunteers recruited 
from the common militia for particular expeditions or purposes. Thus, John 
O’Sullivan and Alan M. Meckler, in their discussion of the colonial militia 
in The Draft and Its Enemies: A Documentary History (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1974), p. 5, somewhat inappropriately use the designation 
“volunteer militia” to refer to both types of volunteers. Mahon,History of the 
Militia, pp. 31–32, helps clarify these terminological issues. For a later use 
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the famed contingents of minutemen, who volunteered to be ready 
at a moment’s notice.7 
When the states put active military forces into the field, they even­
tually fell back upon militia drafts. The Continental Army, the mili­
tary force of the new national government, was initially composed 
entirely of volunteers. But, as the war dragged on, manpower short­
ages became acute, despite the monetary bounties and land grants 
7As John Shy observes in “Hearts and Minds in the American Revolution: 
The Case of ‘Long Bill’ Scott and Peterborough, New Hampshire,” in  A 
People Numerous and Armed, p. 174, the Revolutionary transformation of 
the militia “deserves more attention than it has had.” Shy himself, by focus­
ing on the Revolutionary militia’s political role, emp hasizes its discontin u­
ity with the colonial militia. Don Higginbotham, in contrast, in “The Ameri­
can Militia: A Traditional Institution with Revolutionary Responsibilities,” 
in Reconsiderations of the Revolutionary War: Selected Essays, ed. Don 
Higginbotham (Wesport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 84, concludes 
that the colonial militia “remained structurally much the same in the Revo­
lution, although it was saddled with greater burdens and responsibilities than 
before.” An examination of the actual Revolu tionary militia laws in U.S. 
Selective Service System, Backgrounds of Selective Service, confirms the 
militia’s coercive continuity. 
A good discussion of the militia’s Revolutionary transition, from an ideo­
logical rather than an institutional perspective, is contained in Cress, Citizens 
in Arms, pp. 53–74. The example of Frederick County, Virginia, comes from 
Don Higginbotham,  The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, 
Policies, and Practices, 1763–1789 (New York: Macmillan, 1971), p. 10. See 
also Earl Milton Wheeler, “The Role of the North Carolina Militia in the Be­
ginning of the American Revolution” (Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 1969), 
and his earlier article, “Development and Organization of the North Caro­
lina Militia,” North Carolina Historical Review 41 (July 1964), pp. 318–23. 
One study that has started to fill the gap identified by Shy is Steven Ross­
wurm’s “The Philadelphia Militia, 1775–1783: Active Duty and Active 
Radicalism,” in Arms and Independence: The Military Character of the 
American Revolution, ed. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottes­
ville: University Press of Virginia, 1984), pp. 75–118. Rosswurm’s article, 
based on his dissertation, “Arms, Culture, and Class: The Philadelphia M i­
litia and ‘Lower Orders’ in the American Revolution, 1765–1783” (North­
ern Illinois University, 1979), finds that the Philadelphia common militia, 
in addition to its other military and non-military roles, enforced price con­
trols and was the conduit of radical political action. In contrast, Philadelphia’s 
volunteer militia unit, the City Light Horse, was politically conservative, and 
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offered by both the Continental Congress and the individual states. 
The Continental Army bid for recruits against the active forces of 
the thirteen state militias. Massachusetts began employing conscrip­
tion in the early summer of 1776. New Hampshire followed in 1777, 
and most remaining states fell in line upon recommendation of Con­
gress later that year. The states used these drafts not just to man their 
own forces but also to fill their quotas for the Continental Army.8 
8Revolutionary conscription has not received a single study of its own, an 
incredible deficiency in historical scholarship. Many general accounts of 
the Revolution omit any mention of drafts at all, perpetuating the popular 
impression that there were none. The most complete treatment of the sub­
ject is in Higginbotham’s  The War of American Independence, pp. 390–93. 
Other summaries can be found in Joseph C. Duggan, The Legislative and 
Statutory Development of the Federal Concept of Conscription for Military 
Service (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1964), 
pp. xvii–xxi, 1–6: Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of 
Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775–1945 (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of the Army, 1955), pp. 14–15; O’Sullivan and Meckler, 
The Draft and Its Enemies, pp. 3–19; and Lofgren, “Compulsory Military 
Service Under the Constitution,” 76–79. 
Higginbotham’s The War of American Independence is representative 
of the “new military history,” which has vastly enriched Revolutio nary War 
scholarship. The new military history transcends the traditional preoccupation 
with campaigns and battles to look more deeply at the interaction b etween 
the military and society. In the process, most such works on the Revolution 
at least mention conscription. A skillful synthesis of the new military history, 
James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender’s  A Respectable Army: The 
Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789 (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan 
Davidson, 1982), esp. pp. 89–94, best sets Revolutionary conscription within 
a broader social and military framework. Another of these new works , 
Charles Royster’s  A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army 
and American Character, 1775–1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1979), offers some unsystematic but still valuable snippets 
on the drafts. 
Older state studies of Revolutionary drafts include Jonathan Smith, “How 
Massachusetts Raised Her Troops in the Revolution,” Massachusetts Histor­
ical Society Proceedings 55 (1921–22), pp. 345–70; Arthur J. Alexa nder, 
“Pennsylvania’s Revolutionary Militia,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History 
and Biography 69 (January 1945), pp. 15–25; and Arthur J. Alexander, “How 
Maryland Tried to Raise Her Continental Quotas,” Maryland Historical Mag­
azine 42 (September 1947), pp. 184–96. On North Carolina, see Wheeler, 
“The North Carolina Militia in the American Revolution,” and “Develop­
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Revolutionary conscription remained decentralized, varying from 
state to state. Some states used conventional militia drafts; others im­
pressed vagrants and transients. In general, only single males were 
drafted for short terms, and they could avoid service through the tradi­
tional mechanisms of paying a fine or finding a substitute. Neverthe­
less, at least in some locations, the draft’s compass was wide. A local 
study of Concord, Massachusetts, found that half the males under fifty 
received at least one draft notice during the war. Some notices went 
to women, and others even to the old and crippled.9 In some counties 
A fine state study that falls within the new military history, Richard 
Buel, Jr., Dear Liberty: Connecticut’s Mobilization for the Revolutionary 
War (Middleton, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1980), covers Co n­
necticut’s draft extensively. An especially neglected work that examines 
the Revolutionary drafts in Pennsylvania and to a lesser extent in neighbor­
ing states from the standpoint of conscientious objectors is Ric hard K. Mac-
Master with Samuel L. Horst and Robert F. Ulle, Conscience in Crisis: 
Mennonites and Other Peace Churches in America, 1739–1789 (Scotts­
dale, Penn.: Herald Press, 1979), pp. 213–353. 
For the actual draft laws o f the various states, see U.S. Selective Service 
System, Backgrounds of Selective Service. The Continental Congress passed 
three resolutions urging the states to fill their quotas in the Continental Army 
through conscription. The first, on April 17, 1777—see Journals of the Con­
tinental Congress, 1774–1789 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print­
ing Office, 1904–1937), vol. 7, pp.  262–63—suggested that the states first 
grant exemptions from being drafted into the active state forces to any two 
men who furnished one recruit for the Co ntinental Army. Only if this failed 
to meet the quota should the states draft men directly into the Continental 
Army. The second such resolution, on February 26, 1778—see JCC, vol. 10, 
pp. 199–200—simply “required forthwith” the states to fill their quotas with 
draftees who would serve for nine months. The third resolution, on March 9, 
1779—JCC, vol. 13, p. 229—“earnestly recommended” conscription without 
specifying a term of service. 
The important distinction between conscriptin g men into the Continen­
tal Army and conscripting them into active state forces has so far received 
insufficient attention. Mahon, History of the Militia, p. 38, claims that the 
latter use of the militia was uncommon and illegal, but a perusal of U.S. Se­
lective Service System,  Backgrounds of Selective Service, indicates the oppo­
site. Lofgren, “Compulsory Military Service under the Co nstitution,” p. 77, 
n. 56, finds that Maryland was apparently the only state not to employ a draft
 
to fill its Continental quota. 

9Robert A. Gross, The Minutemen and Their World (New York: Hill and 
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of Virginia, militia drafts provoked rioting. The worst, at Northumber­
land Court House in 1780, resulted in several deaths.10 
Although no one seems to know the precise number of actual 
draftees serving in the Revolutionary forces, several studies have 
determined the relative number of hired substitutes. Within the ac­
tive militias of Lancaster and Northampton Counties in Quaker 
Pennsylvania, 38 and 54 percent respectively of those serving were 
substitutes, while  20 to 40 percent of the New Jersey Line in the 
Continental Army were draft substitutes.11 Some authorities have 
concluded from these high percentages that the draft laws were de­
signed primarily to raise substitutes, and that in practice, very few 
conscriptees were forced to serve.12 
Actually, the large number of hired substitutes implies that many 
others must have been conscripted outright. Unless militia drafts dis­
criminated in operation, calling upon only those who could afford to 
hire substitutes, leaving everyone else exempt, men from the popula­
tion of potential substitutes could not have avoided occasionally be­
ing drafted themselves. Once called, they could hardly have bought 
their way out. Thus, these percentages undoubtedly would be higher 
still if draftees who could not afford substitutes were included. 
10O’Sullivan and Meckler, The Draft and Its Enemies, pp. 8, 14–15, con­
tains a brief review of resistance to Revolutionary conscription. MacMas­
ter, Conscience in Crisis, pp. 213–353, has a great deal about resistance by 
pacifist churches. 
11Arthur J. Alexander, “Service by Substitute in the Militia of Lancaster and 
Northampton Counties (Pennsylvania) during the War of the Revolution,” 
Military Affairs 9 (Fall 1945), pp. 278–82; and Mark Edward Lender, “The 
Social Structure of the New Jersey Brigade: The Continental Line as an 
American Standing Army,” in  The Military in America, ed. Karsten, p. 33. 
12For instance, John Shy, “American Society and Its War for Independence,” 
in Reconsiderations of the Revolutionary War, ed. Higginbotham, p. 79, as­
serts that “In fact, down at the grass roots, men were almost never drafted.” 
But Rosswurm, “The Philadelphia Militia, 1775–1783,” pp. 101–2, indicates 
otherwise, at least in Pennsylvania—the one state that could be expected, 
because of its large Quaker population, to have the most porous draft sys­
tem. The fact that those who refused a draft call were almost always fined 
rather than forcibly inducted might make it difficult to distinguish between 
those who answered a call voluntarily and those who answered it because 
they could not afford a substitute or fine. Yet, MacMas ter, Conscience in 
Crisis, p. 293, cites instances in which conscientious o bjectors, rather than 
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Figures from the Civil War offer a crude way of estimating the 
possible Revolutionary ratio of actual draftees to draft substitutes, be­
cause the Union’s 1863 draft law similarly allowed for hired substi­
tutes and exemption fees. The first two calls garnered 13,297 draft­
ees and 119,646 substitutes—approximately one draftee for every 
nine substitutes—with 84,966 paying the exemption fee.13 Overall, 
537,672 men entered the Union army during the period of these calls, 
most of them direct volunteers. Paid substitutes constituted only 22 
percent of the total, a proportion at the lower end of those known for 
the Revolution. This would suggest that, at a minimum, actual draft­
ees accounted for 2.5 percent of total Revolutionary troops—the same 
proportion as under the Union’s first two calls. 
During the Union’s third call, the relative number of draftees in­
creased to 26,205, as compared with 58,086 substitutes—almost one 
draftee for every two substitutes—and 1,298 exemptions. The exemp­
tion fee, however, had been abolished for all except conscientious ob­
jectors, driving up the price of substitutes. Overall, 272,463 men en­
tered the Union army during this period, maintaining the proportion 
of substitutes at approximately the same level, 21 percent. But the 
proportion of draftees was now at nearly 10 percent, which gives a 
good upper-bound estimate for the Revolutionary period. 
THE FEDERALISTS AND 

THE EARLY NATIONAL PERIOD 

With the winning of independence, the Continental Congress re­
jected George Washington’s proposal for a peacetime standing army 
supported by a nationally uniform militia with universal conscription.14 
13William L. Shaw, “The Civil War Federal Conscription and Exemption Sy s­
tem,” Judge Advocate Journal 32 (February 1962), p. 16. These figures also 
appear in Eugene C. Murdock, Patriotism Limited, 1862–1865: The Civil War 
Draft and the Bounty System (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1967), 
p. 13. Murdock, however, gives only the number of men who hired substitutes 
after being drafted. He inadvertently omits an even greater number of eligible 
men who gained exemption by hiring substitutes  prior to the draft calls. If these 
substitutes are not counted, then the ratio of draftees to substitutes increases. 
14Washington’s “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment” is reprinted in  Amer­
ican Military Thought, ed. Walter Millis (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1966), pp. 16–28, and excerpted in O’Sullivan and Meckler, The Draft and Its 
Enemies, pp. 26–28. The most comprehensive work on U.S. military policy 
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It discharged all of the Continental Army except for a remnant of eighty 
men and a few officers. As an alternative to a national army, the states 
retained full control over the militias. However, the common militia’s 
compulsory nature remained intact. Hence, in 1786, when Virginia 
commissioned Revolutionary hero George Rogers Clark to lead a 
military campaign from what became Kentucky against the Indians, 
militiamen were drafted into his force, touching off widespread eva­
sion, and then organized mutiny.15 
Although Congress virtually disbanded the Continental Army, 
national acquisition of the Northwest Territory during the Revolution 
had shifted the burden of policing that area from the states to a nation­
al force of some kind. Consequently, the Continental Congress author­
ized in 1784 a small frontier constabulary to be raised voluntarily from 
the state militias for one year. (The Southwest Territory, as yet unced­
ed by the states, got along without Congressional attention.) When the 
original enlistments expired in 1785, Congress converted this small 
force into a semi-standing army of regulars by authorizing new three­
year recruits, without any direct reference to state militias. In 1786, 
in reaction to Shay’s Rebellion in western Massachusetts, Congress 
voted to enlarge this frontier army from 700 to 2,000 men. Recruit­
ment, however, failed to produce many additional soldiers. 
Federalists such as Washington found these military arrangements 
unsatisfactory. They desired a national military strong enough to rival 
H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: Federalists and the Creation of the Military 
Establishment in America, 1783–1802 (New York: Free Press, 1975). See 
also Cress, Citizens in Arms, pp. 75–149, for the underlying ideological con­
text. Don Higginbotham, “The Debate Over National Military Instit utions: 
An Issue Slowly Resolved, 1775–1815,” in The American Revolution: Chang­
ing Perspectives, ed. William M. Fowler, Jr. and Wallace Coyle (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1979), pp. 149–68, surveys a slightly longer 
period in less detail. 
15Temple Bodley, George Rogers Clark: His Life and Public Service (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1926), pp. 282–86. Most accounts of this Indian expedi­
tion mention the militia mutiny, but fail to mention the draft that caused it. 
See, for instance, Leonard C. Helderman, “The Northwest Exp edition of 
George Rogers Clark, 1786–1787,” Mississippi Valley Hi storical Review 
25 (December 1938),pp. 317–34; or John Bakeless, Back ground to Glory: 
The Life of George Rogers Clark  (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1957), pp. 319– 
21. In fact, since Clark led the militia into the Northwest territory, beyond 
Virginia’s borders at the time, in open contradiction of state law, the militia 
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those of the European states and to quell domestic disturbances. They 
succeeded in putting their military ideas into the new Constitution. 
“Though the point has not often been noticed,” Walter Millis wrote 
in his classic study of U.S. military policy, “the Constitution was as 
much a military as a political and economic charter.”16 It granted the 
central government unequivocal authority both to create a standing 
national military and to nationalize state militias. 
Once the Constitution took effect, the Washington administration 
used trouble with Indians in the Northwest Territory to justify a national 
army that numbered nearly 4,000 regulars by 1795. Congress, how­
ever, hesitated to authorize a force of this size too precipitately, and 
actual recruiting lagged behind authorizations. Congress, therefore, 
delegated to the President the emergency power to call out the state 
militias for frontier defense.17 Consequently, the national government, 
16Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History (New 
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1956), p. 47. 
Interestingly enough, awareness of the militia’s coercive nature has found 
its way into the legal literature debating whether the Constitution originally 
envisaged conscription. Indeed, those legal scholars who find modern con­
scription unconstitutional rest their claim upon the sharp distinction early 
Americans made between the militia and standing armies. The Constitution’s 
guarded militia clauses, they concede, gave the new national government 
access to conscription, but only under highly restricted circumstances. The 
clauses that refer to an army were distinct, and authorized a military force 
that would consist exclusively of volunteers. In other words, the Constit u­
tion’s militia clauses gave the national government one military force that 
could be raised through drafts but whose use was severely restricted, whereas 
the army clauses gave it a second military force that could be used for any 
purpose but whose raising was restricted. 
The most objective examination of this question is Lofgren, “Compulsory 
Military Service Under the Constitution.” Lofgren finds the evidence not 
totally conclusive, but the weight of it indicates that the Constitution did not 
grant the national government the power to draft men into the regular army. 
For the best of the somewhat polemic legal literature, see, on the pro-draft 
side, Michael J. Malbin, “Conscription, the Constit ution, and the Framers: 
A Historical Analysis,” Fordham Law Review 40 (May 1972), pp. 805–26; 
on the anti-draft side, see Leon Friedman, “Conscription and the Constit u­
tion: The Original Understanding,” Michigan Law Review 67 (May 1969), 
pp. 1493–552, reprinted in Anderson, The Military Draft , pp. 231–96. 
17An act of September 29, 1789, 1 U.S. Statutes at Large 95, gave the Presi­
dent a one-year authorization to call out the militia for frontier defense. It was 
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when preparing its first Indian campaign under General Josiah Harmar 
in 1790, supplemented the regulars with 1,500 militia from Kentucky 
and Pennsylvania —most of them raised by state militia drafts. Both 
Harmar’s expedition, three-fourths militia, and a subsequent mixed 
expedition under General Arthur St. Clair, went down to ignominious 
defeat at the hands of the Indians. 
The Federalists did not finally subdue the Northwest tribes until 
1794, after they had enlarged the standing army enough to mount an 
expedition consisting primarily of army regulars under General “Mad” 
Anthony Wayne. Ever since, Wayne’s victory at the Battle of Fallen 
Timbers has been cited as proof of the militia’s military inferiority. 
However, because most of the militia in the previous campaigns had 
been drafted, whereas the regulars were volunteers, his victory could 
as logically prove the inferiority of conscription. The fact that Wayne’s 
command also included a significant contingent of Kentucky militia— 
but militia that were well-paid mounted volunteers rather than draft­
ees—gives additional support to this alternate interpretation. Indeed, 
the frequent condemnations of the American militia by professional 
military officers, from Washington forward, assume a whole new 
meaning in light of the extensive resort to militia drafts during early 
U.S. history.18 
Statutes at Large 119, made this authorization permanent. A section of the 
act of March 3, 1791, expanding the regular army, 1 U.S. Statutes at Large 
222, extended this authorization to bring the army to full strength or provide 
it with cavalry. 
18For the Harmar expedition, the national government called up 500 militia 
from Pennsylvania and 1,000 from Kentucky. Harmar eventually fielded 320 
regulars and 1,133 militia. For the St. Clair expedition, the national govern­
ment summoned 1,000 militia from Kentucky, but only 470 turned out. St. 
Clair also started out with 625 regulars and 1,674 six-month levies. (A hy­
brid between regulars and the militia, levies were volunteers who, like the 
militia, served only short terms but who, like the regulars, were recruited 
without reference to state governments.) Only about 1,400 of St. Clair’s orig­
inal force participated in his concluding campaign. Wayne’s command at 
the Battle of Fallen Timbers comprised 2,000 regulars and 1,600 mounted 
volunteers from Kentucky. The militia in the first two campaigns were not 
only drafted, but were paid a mere $3 per month while in national service, 
as compared with the mounted volu nteers, who received $20 per month. 
Even allowing for the additional expense of providing mounts, this repre­
sented a considerable discrepancy. The mounted volu nteers were  not part 
of the Kentucky militia’s standing volunteer units, but were recruited and 
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At the same time the Federalists created a standing army, they 
also attempted to consolidate control over the state militias. Henry 
Knox, President Washington’s Secretary of War, submitted to Con­
gress a plan for national training and supervision of the militia. At 
the heart of Knox’s plan was a scheme for classifying the state mili­
tias on the basis of age. The “advanced corps” of those aged eighteen 
to twenty would receive ten to thirty extra days of federal training 
per year, much like modern reservists and members of the National 
Guard, except that membership would be mandatory for every male 
in the age bracket. Service in the advanced corps would, in fact, be­
come a prerequisite for citizenship. The advanced corps could then 
be continuously ready for immediate mobilization.19 
The fullest discussions of the use of militia draftees on the Harmer and 
St. Clair expeditions, as well as the use of mounted volunteers on the Wayne 
expedition, are Richard G. Stone, Jr., The Brittle Sword: The Kentucky Mili­
tia, 1776–1912 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), pp. 22–30; 
and John K. Mahon, “The Citizen Soldier in National Defense, 1789–1815” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1950), pp. 19–52, 
93–101. Kohn’s account in  Eagle and Sword , pp. 91–127, 141–57, also al­
ludes to these militia drafts, and reports that Wayne at one point almost re­
sorted to such a draft. Otherwise, as in the case of the Clark expedition dis­
cussed in note 15 above, most accounts of the Federalist Indian expeditions 
overlook the militia drafts. See especially the standard military account of 
these campaigns, James Ripley Jacobs, Beginnings of the U.S. Army, 1783– 
1812 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947), pp. 40–188. 
19Knox’s militia plan is reprinted in O’Sullivan and Meckler, The Draft and 
Its Enemies, pp. 28–36. Kohn, Eagle and Sword , pp. 128–38, suggests that 
the Was hington administration deliberately made the plan u nacceptable to 
Congress to undermine the militia system and build support for a standing 
army. He repeats this thesis more strongly in “The Murder of the Militia 
System in the Aftermath of the American Revolution,” in Military History 
of the American Revolution: The Proceedings of the 6th Military History 
Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 10–11 October 1974, ed. 
Stanley J. Underdal (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1976), pp. 110–26. 
Higginbotham, “The Debate Over National Military Institutions,” p. 159, 
is skeptical of Kohn’s thesis. Along with the difficulties Higginbotham men­
tions, the similarity of the Knox plan to later Republican proposals for mili­
tia overhaul, as noted later in the text, renders Kohn’s speculation extremely 
doubtful. In fact, the vote against the Knox plan crossed over the emerging 
partisan lines. More significant factors in the Knox plan’s defeat appear to 
have been its high cost—$400,000 annually for the advanced corps alone— 
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Congress rejected most of Knox’s plan, but, under the pressure of 
St. Clair’s devastating defeat—the worst for U.S. arms until Custer’s 
last stand at Little Big Horn—it did pass the Uniform Militia Act of 
1792. Although military historians have tended to denigrate this act 
because it failed to go as far as Knox wished, the Uniform Militia Act 
firmly etched into national statute the principle of universal military 
obligation. It required the enrollment of every free, white, able -bodied 
male citizen between eighteen and forty-five (with some exemptions, 
to which the states could add) in the militia of his state. Each citizen 
was to equip himself at his own expense. In response to this act, all 
fifteen states enacted new militia laws, each of which reaffirmed the 
state government’s power to conscript.20 
A second Congressional measure that passed at the same time, 
the Calling Forth Act, specified the general conditions under which 
state militias could be called into national service. In a clause all but 
ignored by historians, the Act instituted heavy fines for failure to re­
port when drafted for national service. Just as when responding to 
state calls, each militia district had a quota to be filled first by volun­
teers and then by draftees. Because the Act still left the actual draft­
ing to the states, fines became the dual responsibility of both levels 
of government. State militia courts-martial would assess fines, and 
20The Uniform Militia Act (May 8, 1792) is 1 U.S. Statutes at Large 271. It 
is also reprinted in full in Millis, American Military Thought, pp. 62–67, and 
in part in O’Sullivan and Meckler, The Draft and its Enemies, pp. 36–39. The 
register of military historians dismissing this act begins with Major General 
Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Washin gton, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1917), pp. 82–85. Among others, in addi­
tion to Kohn, are Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians, pp. 179–86; Kreidberg and 
Henry, History of Military Mobilization, pp. 30–31; Millis, Arms and Men, 
pp. 50–52; O’Sullivan and Meckler, The Draft and Its Enemies, pp. 22–23; 
Rafuse, “United States’ Experience with Volunteer and Conscript Forces,” 
p. 7; Riker, Soldiers of the States, pp. 18–22; Harry M. Ward, The Depart­
ment of War, 1781–1795 (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1962), p. 143; and Weigley, History of the United States Army , pp. 93–94. 
Only Mahon, in his outstanding and singular monograph on how state mili­
tias actually operated during the Federalist era, The American Militia: Dec­
ade of Decision, pp. 14–24 ff., has bothered to exa mine the impact of this 
act upon state legislation. Mahon’s monograph is based on his important 
but neglected dissertation, “The Citizen Soldier in National Defense, 1789– 
1815,” which covers a longer period, and some of his unique insights have 




Journal of Libertarian Studies 
the national government would collect them.21 
The Federalist State first found use for its new militia legislation in 
1794, when it smashed the Whiskey Tax rebellion in western Penn­
sylvania. For this demonstration, Washington called up from four 
state militias no fewer than 12,950 men—more than he had usually 
commanded during the Revolution. Militia drafts proved necessary 
to raise this overwhelming force, and hostility to these drafts sparked 
further disturbances in eastern Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland.22 
21The Calling Forth Act (May 2, 1792) is 1 U.S. Statutes at Large 264. Some­
times the Calling Forth Act and the Uniform Militia Act are treated as one, 
and they both—together or separately—are often referred to as the M ilitia 
Act of 1792. Among military historians, again only Mahon, The American 
Militia: Decade of Decision, pp. 21, 26–27, has noted the penalties for draft 
resistance within the Calling Forth Act. A striking example of the prevailing 
historical oversight with regard to the act’s penalties is provided by Millis, 
American Military Thought, pp. 61–62. Millis reprints the first part of the 
Act, but omits later sections, beginning with sec. 5, the very one that pro­
vides penalties for draft resistance. 
22Considering the huge amount of historical attention t hat the Whiskey Re­
bellion has received, it is surprising that the necessity for militia drafts in its 
suppression was not widely noted until the publication of Thomas P. Slaugh­
ter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution 
(New Yo rk: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 210–14. Slaughter estimates 
that the number of conscripts within the ranks of the so-called Watermelon 
Army was startlingly high, varying between 75 and 100 percent. These es­
timates exclude, however, the volunteer militia units that constituted an al­
most distinct operational component of the Watermelon Army. 
Previous accounts of the Whiskey Rebellion that touch upon conscription 
include William Findley, History of the Insurrection in the Four Western 
Counties of Pennsylvania in the Year 1794 (Philadelphia: S.H. Smith, 1796), 
pp. 140–68; Leland Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels: The Story of a Frontier Upris­
ing (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1939), pp. 221–23; 
Robert W. Coakely, “Federal Use of Militia and t he National Guard in Civil 
Disturbances: The Whiskey Rebellion to Little Rock,” in  Bayonets in the 
Streets: The Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances, ed. Robin Higham (Law­
rence: University Press of Kansas, 1969), pp. 19–20; and Mahon, “The Citi­
zen Soldier in National Defense,” pp. 109–14. Hostility to the draft was so 
strong in Pennsylvania that the state government eventually offered boun­
ties and pay raises—in addition to the standard federal pay for militia in 
federal service—to entice militia volunteers. 
After Washington had called out the militia, Congress passed a special 




Hummel — The American Militia and the Origins of Conscription 
With this experience behind them, the Federalists in 1795 slightly 
modified the Calling Forth Act to eliminate some of its procedural 
safeguards against putting the militia  under national control.23 
Liberal provisions of various states for exemptions and substitutes 
made the conscription inherent in the two national militia acts far from 
universal. Historians have therefore tended to view these acts as minor 
and inconsequential. Even Arthur Ekirch, who is a thoroughgoing anti­
militarist, holds that the Uniform Militia Act 
added little to the nominal service traditionally required of 
the citizen militia in England and American colonies. . . . 
[T]he militia duty of the early days of the republic bore 
slight resemblance to the type of military service actually 
exacted later in the United States under the conscription 
and selective service laws.24 
Because militia service could be avoided by paying a fine or hiring a 
substitute, some economic historians have treated compulsory militia 
duty as a mere tax-in-kind infrequently substituting for what should 
be considered a monetary tax.25 
the power to station a force of 2,500 militia in the four western counties of 
Pennsylvania for up to three months. 
23Act of February 28, 1795, 1 U.S. Statutes at Large 424. The revised Calling 
Forth Act eliminated, with respect to the President’s power to call forth the 
militia to enforce national laws, the requirement for a judicial certificate and 
the limitation as to time. Some commentators have mistakenly concluded 
that the revised act was  more restrictive. This results from confusing the 
section applying to the suppression of insurrection within states with the 
section applying to enforcement of national laws. The militia’s use in the 
former case required the application of the state legislature or executive. 
This restriction was in both acts and was not extended to the enforcement 
of national laws by eliminating the requirement for a judicial certificate in 
the revised act. 
Prior to revising the Calling Forth Act, Congress had passed an act on 
June 5, 1794, 1 U.S. Statutes at Large 381, allowing use of the militia for en­
forcing neutrality laws. 
24Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and the Military: A History of the Amer­
ican Antimilitarist Tradition (New York: Longmans, Green, 1955), pp. 34, 
47, emphasis added. 
25Rafuse takes this approach in “United States’ Experience with Volunteer 
and Conscript Forces,” p. 11, in reference not to the actual militia drafts o f 
this period, but to the far more comprehensive national conscription proposals 
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There is no doubt that America’s militia drafts of the late eight­
eenth and early nineteenth centuries could not match twentieth-cen­
tury drafts in effectiveness and ruthlessness. Exemptions, fines, and 
substitutes clearly made conscription less onerous. Yet, the Civil War 
drafts of both Union and Confederacy started out with exemption fees 
and substitutes, and no one has ever argued that these were not true 
drafts. Even if viewed as a tax, militia fines and substitutes were a re­
gressive one. In addition, research by John Mahon indicates that, in 
amount, the fines were far from nominal. The authorities could seize 
and sell all of a man’s property to satisfy these fines. And, as this was 
a period in which imprisonment for unpaid debts—especially unpaid 
debts to the government—was standard, prison was, in fact, the ultimate 
penalty for evading militia service. As Mahon concludes, “militia duty 
had to be taken into account directly by one-tenth of the entire popula­
tion, or, counting families of militiamen, by two-fifths. No other govern­
mental relationship except taxpaying touched so many individuals.”26 
In the early national period, both national and state governments 
turned frequently to the common militia. After the Whiskey Rebellion, 
would have been closer to an all-volunteer force than either t oday’s draft or 
the French Revolutionary levee on [sic] masse.” “Never before or since in 
American history has such a total recognition of the tax aspect of the draft 
been coupled with so complete an attempt to tax everyone according to abil­
ity to pay, personal inclinations, and minimal exemp tions.” Cotton M. Lind­
say, “Our National Tradition of Conscription: The Early Years,” in Why the 
Draft? The Case for a Volunteer Army , ed. James C. Miller, III (Baltimore: 
Penguin, 1968), pp. 121–23, contains similar observations, but confines them 
precisely to the single War of 1812 proposal to which they are truly applic able, 
the Troup Bill. See the discussion of the War of 1812 in the text. 
To his credit, Rafuse is one of the few draft historians who realizes that 
if conscription is employed, the much-maligned practice of hiring substitutes 
actually makes it more efficient and equitable, not less. Moreover, militia 
drafts admittedly did have one superiority over the use of regulars. Since the 
militia system was decentralized, it tended to impose the costs of military 
action and law enforcement only upon the residents of the area concerned, 
in those cases in which the condition was localized. Thus, during the Fed­
eralist Indian campaigns, the use of the militia forced the frontier to bear the 
costs of suppressing Indians, whereas the use of regulars coercively spread 
these costs to the rest of the country. 
26Mahon, The American Militia: Decade of Decision, p. 66. On pp. 47–48, 
Mahon examines the severity of militia fines, as he also does in  History of 
the Militia, pp. 59–60. See also Lena Londen, “The Militia Fine, 1830–1860,” 
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the national government not only called up the militia to put down 
resistance to other national laws,27 but also passed at every foreign 
crisis special acts ordering the states to prepare militia detachments 
for instant mobilization.28 States called out the militia on their own 
27The Washington administration, in addition to employing the militia in the 
Indian campaigns and the Whiskey Rebellion, induced seaboard governors 
to enforce Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation, the 1794 Ne utrality Act, 
and the 1794 embargo with their militias. Federalist President John Adams 
called out the militia to crush the Fries tax rebellion in eastern Pennsylvania 
during the Quasi-War with France in 1799. President Jefferson called upon 
the militia to forestall possible insurrection in the newly acquired Louisiana 
Territory in 1803, to suppress the alleged Burr Conspiracy in 1806, to d efend 
the coast after the Chesapeake-Leopard  affair in 1807, and (see n. 30) to en­
force the embargo of 1808–9. The Madison administration had occasion to 
put the militia in federal service in the Michigan Territory and along the Can­
adian border. More importantly, it alerted militia during its annexation of west 
Florida in 1810, and put militia into action against Indians in the Battle of 
Tippecanoe in 1811. Mahon, “The Citizen Soldier in National Defense,” pp. 
123–24, 133–34, 247–51, mentions all these national recourses to the militia 
prior to the War of 1812, although he does not reveal to what extent any of 
them involved conscription. 
For additional details on domestic uses of militia by the national govern­
ment, see Coakely, “Federal Use of Militia and the National Guard in Civil 
Disturbances,” pp. 13–25; Bennett Milton Rich, The Presidents and Civil 
Disorder (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1941), pp. 2–34; and 
Frederic T. Wilson, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances, 1787–1903, 77th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 1903, Senate Doc. 209, pp. 33–54. Unlike in the Whiskey 
Rebellion, the national government also deployed regulars in conjunction 
with the militia in the Fries Rebellion, in the Burr Conspiracy, and in the 
enforcement of Jefferson’s embargo. Although the Federalists had included 
in an act on March 2, 1799, 1 U.S. Statutes at Large 725, an authorization 
for such use of federal volunteers, there was no similar specific statutory 
authorization for regulars until Jefferson, ironically, secured passage of an 
act on March 8, 1807, 2 U.S. Statutes at Large 443, allowing the use of regu­
lars “in all cases . . . where it is lawful for the President of the United States 
to call forth the militia.” 
28With the stirring of international troubles in 1794, the first Detachment 
Act passed, requiring the states to ready a detachment of 80,000 militia for 
national call. This act represented a Jeffersonian Republican effort to head 
off the Federalist move to create an army reserve—or, as it was then referred 
to, a Provisional Army —directly responsive to the national government, ex­
actly as the U.S. has today. A summary list of these various Detachment Acts, 
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9 May 1794 1 Statutes 367 80,000 militia 
24 Jun 1797 1 Statutes 522 80,000 militia 
3 Mar 1803 2 Statutes 241 80,000 militia 
18 Apr 1806 2 Statutes 383 100,000 militia 
30 Mar 1808 2 Statutes 478 100,000 militia 
10 Apr 1812 2 Statutes 705 100,000 militia 
These acts were all very similar. (For slight differences in the maximum term 
of national service that they set for the militia, see note 31.) 
Even with passage of the Detachment Acts, the Federalists still got a 
Provisional Army Act, in May 1798, at the outset of the Quasi-War. This 
act was notable not only for authorizing a Provisional Army of 10,000, but 
also for allowing the national government directly to enlist volunteer militia 
units for terms of up to three years. It thus built upon the precedent of recruit­
ing six-month levies during the St. Clair expedition to further develop a hy­
brid category between regulars and militia. 
The Republicans feared that the act was a sinister attempt to undermine 
state control over the militia system, but after the Chesapeake-Leopard  af­
fair in 1807, Jefferson himself secured the authority to recruit 30,000 one­
year volunteers. The major difference between this Republican measure and 
the previous Federalist one was that the Federalists had empowered the Pres­
ident to appoint the officers in volunteer units, while the Republicans left 
this to the states. By the War of 1812, the new category of state-organized 
federal volunteers was well established. A summary of the acts responsible 
for this new component follows: 
3 Mar 1791 1 Statutes 222 2,000 levies 
28 May 1798 1 Statutes 558 10,000 Provisional Army 
+ volunteers 
24 Feb 1807 2 Statutes 419 30,000 volunteers 
6 Feb 1812 2 Statutes 676 50,000 volunteers 
27 Jan 1815 2 Statutes 193 40,000 state troops 
+ 40,000 volunteers 
During the War of 1812, the Republicans amended the call for 50,000 
volunteers with an act on July 6, 1812, 2 U.S. Statutes at Large 785, which 
returned to the Federalist system of having the President appoint the officers 
of volunteer units. Later, on January 29, 1813, 2 U.S. Statutes at Large 794, 
the Republicans tried to abandon the volunteer category altogether and in­
stead rely totally upon regulars and the militia. However, after the failure of 
the Madison administration’s proposals for national conscription, the act of 
January 27, 1815, listed above (and discussed in the section of the text dealing 
with the War of 1812) reinstated the category. In the Mexican War, volunteers 
became the national government’s primary alternative to regulars. 
This innovation added still another meaning to the term “volunteer.” 
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(although sometimes with national reimbursement) to battle Indians 
on the Southwest frontier, enforce national neutrality laws and trade 
embargoes, stand guard over the coast, capture criminals and fugitive 
slaves, control city riots, enforce quarantines, and perform various 
other chores.29 If conscription was not actually implemented in all 
these instances, it was at least always legally imminent. 
THE REPUBLICANS AND THE WAR OF 1812 
When the Jeffersonian Republicans came to power in 1801, they 
proceeded to dismantle the Federalist State. In particular, they slashed 
expenditures on the army and navy. However, this made their attach­
ment to the coercive militia system even more pronounced than that 
of the Federalists. Whatever its alleged dangers, the national standing 
army that the Federalists created was composed entirely of volunteers. 
Thomas Jefferson, however, denounced this dependence upon “pauper 
hirelings.” He spoke of the “necessity of obliging every citizen to be 
a soldier.” “We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens,” 
he wrote, “and make military instruction a regular part of collegiate 
close, but not total. Pre-existing volunteer militia units sometimes comprised 
the federal volunteers, and the acts of 1798 and 1807 had greatly stimulated 
the establishment of such standing units. Often, however, units o f federal 
volunteers were created ad hoc out of recruits from the common militia, and 
would disband upon discharge. Finally, it must be reme mbered that the reg­
ulars, too, were voluntarily enlisted. Despite their long-nurtured mutual an­
tipathy, the only re al difference between federal volunteers and regulars, once 
organized and in service, was that volunteers had shorter terms. 
29The most thorough discussions of the militia’s employment by state gov­
ernments during the early national period are Mahon, The American Militia: 
Decade of Decision, pp. 47–55, and “The Citizen Soldier in National Defense,” 
pp. 73–92, 135–88, 213–32. The national government’s practice of encour­
aging states to use their militias by providing financial reimburs ement was 
common, but few historians have looked into it. The campaigns against the 
Indians of the Southwest territory in particular merit additional research. The 
national government’s war against the Northwest Indians has received all 
the fanfare because the regulars were involved and Indian resistance was 
more serious, but the national government also financed a s imultaneous “war” 
against the Southwest tribes, conducted covertly through state and territ orial 
militias. It would be nice to know to what extent, if any, militia drafts were 
implemented during these operations. This question is not addressed in Ward, 
The Department of War, pp. 154–66, which is almost the only study that 





Journal of Libertarian Studies 
education.”30 
President Jefferson and his Republican successor, James Madi­
son, desiring a classification scheme similar to Knox’s rejected plan, 
As quoted by Sidney Forman, “Thomas Jefferson on Universal Military 
Training,” Military Affairs 11 (Fall 1947), p. 178. The Forman article is re­
printed in Editors of Military Affairs, Military Analysis of the Revolutionary 
War, pp. 55–56. Jefferson made these statements in a letter to James Mon­
roe during the War of 1812, but they accurately reflect his earlier ideas. 
Unfortunately, there is no single study of Republican military policy to 
complement Kohn’s  Eagle and Sword  on Federalist military policy. The best 
substitute is Cress, Citizens in Arms, pp. 150–77, an excellent treatment more 
of Republican military attitudes than of Republican military policies. Addi­
tional details on policy are found throughout J.C.A. Stagg’s  Mr. Madison’s 
War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 
1783–1830 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), which is the 
first modern study of the War of 1812 truly to integrate the diplomatic, mili­
tary, and domestic aspects of that conflict, and to fit them into the general 
Republican outlook. Although Mahon’s  American Militia: Decade of Decision 
does not extend into the Jeffersonian era, his dissertation, “The Citizen Sol­
dier in National Defense, 1789–1815,” pp. 213–465, does, offering much 
valuable information on the militia—at both the state and national level— 
unavailable elsewhere. 
Jefferson’s attachment to the coercive militia system is just one indic a­
tion that his reputation for anti-militarism is somewhat inflated. Indeed, his 
administration made several other compromises with military “necessity”: 
(1) Jefferson left on the books the Alien Enemy Act, the one of the four Fed­
eralist Alien and Sedition Acts that allowed for wartime internment (and which 
was unearthed and used with telling effect by President Wilson during World 
War I); 
(2) Jefferson’s administration oversaw the founding of the U.S. Military Aca­
demy at West Point, as well as the Army Corps of Engineers, both of which 
dovetailed with Jefferson’s penchant for State education; and 
(3) Jefferson gained the first statutory authorization for using regulars in law 
enforcement (see note 27). 
As Marcus Cunliffe has pointed out in his seminal discussion of U.S. 
military culture through the Civil War, Soldiers and Civilians, pp. 1–27, 
American attitudes toward the military have historically consisted of not 
two, but three distinct perspectives: (1) the professional military tradition, 
favoring conventional standing armies; (2) the anti-professional militia tra­
dition, favoring citizen soldiers; and (3) the pacifist tradition, opposing all 
military expedients. The Jeffersonian Republicans fall within the second 
tradition, which is too often not distinguished carefully enough from the 
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repeatedly called for militia reorganization. In effect, they hoped to 
conscript a massive reserve of citizen soldiers, as was done in Swit­
zerland. Throughout this period, whenever the idea of militia classi­
fication was resurrected, it was simply a code that, in modern termi­
nology, meant a national system of universal military training. 
Congress proved as indifferent to Jefferson’s classification scheme 
as it had been to Knox’s. The only concrete steps it took toward militia 
reorganization were: (1) in 1803, to require annual militia reports from 
each state’s adjutant general; (2) to lengthen intermittently the militia’s 
maximum term, when called into national service, from three to six 
months; and (3) to pass an 1808 measure appropriating $200,000 an­
nually to help arm state militias. (The appropriation was the first grant-
in-aid in U.S. history. The original bill was introduced, ironically, by 
John Randolph of Roanoke, a stalwart Republican opponent of cen­
tralization. It called for a much larger annual amount.) Jefferson also 
secured the power to use state militias in the routine, day-to-day im­
position of his hated and widely resisted embargo.31 
31An act on March 2, 1803, 2 U.S. Statutes at Large 207, set the requirement 
for annual militia returns. Although the Uniform Militia Act of 1792 had 
required each state’s adjutant general to send to the national government 
duplicates of the annual militia returns made for the state government, the 
new act required uniform returns to be compiled directly for the national 
government. The Republican administrations were also much more adamant 
about collecting such returns. 
The Detachment Acts (see note 28) of April 18, 1806, March 30, 1808, 
and April 10, 1812, 2 U.S. Statutes at Large 383, 478, 705, set the militia’s 
term, if called into national service, at six months. All three acts expired af­
ter two years. In contrast, the first two Federalist Detachment Acts (1794 
and 1797) provided three-month terms, the same as in the Calling Forth 
Act. The first Republican Detachment Act of March 3, 1803, 2 U.S. Statutes 
at Large 241, was ambiguous. It stated no specific term for the militia, 
while establishing a one-year term for any volunteer units that states provided 
in lieu of common militia. 
An act of April 23, 1808, 2 U.S. Statutes at Large 490, established the 
annual appropriation for militia arms. Randolph wanted $1 million appropri­
ated annually. Earlier, during the war crisis with France, an act of July 6, 1798, 
1 U.S. Statutes at Large 576, permitted states to purchase arms for the militia 
from the national arsenals, and Congress had passed various acts allowing the 
sale or loan of national arms to militia and volunteer units while they were 
in national service. 
The Second Enforcement Act (January 7, 1809), 2 U.S. Statutes at Large 
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Subsequently, during the War of 1812, when volunteers yielded 
only enough manpower to raise the regular army to slightly more than 
half its authorized strength of 63,000, James Monroe, Madison’s Secre­
tary of War, proposed conscripting an army of 100,000. Monroe of­
fered two possible ways of doing this: either the national government 
could draft men into the regular army for two years, or it could classify 
and directly draft the militia into national service for two years without 
going through state governments. Monroe’s second conscription plan 
was similar to what Jefferson and Madison had in mind all along.32 
the embargo without the stipulation—which appears in the first and second 
Calling Forth Acts—that resistance to national laws must be too powerful 
for ordinary procedures of the courts and marshals to handle. The Act also 
allowed the President to delegate this broad power to others. It aroused such 
a storm of protest that it was instrumental in bringing about the total repeal 
of the embargo two months later. For further details on this Act and on Jef­
ferson’s use of the militia to enforce the embargo, see Leonard D. White, The 
Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative Hi story, 1801–1829 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1951), pp. 460–68; Leonard W. Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liber­
ties: The Darker Side, rev. ed. (New York: Quandrangle, 1973), pp. 107–20, 
137–41; and Rich, The Presidents and Civil Disorder, pp. 31–37. 
The Jefferson administration was also responsible for a fifth, minor, 
militia innovation. An act of March 3, 1803, 2 U.S. Statutes at Large 215, 
established the common militia in the District of Columbia. 
32The most complete discussion of the proposal for national conscription dur­
ing the War of 1812 is the first section of Jack Franklin Leach’s  Conscription 
in the United States: Historical Background (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. 
Tuttle, 1952). Fortunately, Leach’s heavy-handed, pro-conscription bias does 
not outweigh the richness of his account. Ot her good discussions include 
Edward J. Harden, The Life of George M. Troup (Savannah, Ga.: E.J. Purse, 
1859), pp. 141–55; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 
pp. 47–56; Lindsay, “Our National Tradition of Conscription: The Early 
Years,” pp. 114–23; O’Sullivan and Meckler, The Draft and Its Enemies, 
pp. 24–25, 40–52; Rafuse, “United States’ Experience with Vo lunteer and 
Conscript Forces,” pp. 8–13; and Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War, pp. 453–68. 
Nearly all of these works at least hint at the exi stence of state conscription 
during the war, but none gives even a summary discussion of the matter. 
Some authors, following Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, 
p. 137, report that 65,032 regulars (including 5,000 in the navy and the ma­
rines) served during the War of 1812. These forces did not all serve simult a­
neously, however. According to the Historical Statistics of the United States 
from Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print­
ing Office, 1975), vol. 2, p. 1142, regulars never exceeded 39,000 in total 
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Because the war ended before national conscription could pass, 
this has left the mistaken impression that the U.S. fought the War of 
1812 without conscription altogether. On the contrary, state govern­
ments continuously relied upon drafts to raise more than 200,000 sol­
diers who served in the militia at various moments and for various 
durations. Sometimes states drafted the militia in response to national 
calls, in which case they generally adhered to the “Rules with Regard 
to Militia Draughts” set forth in official army regulations of May 1, 
1813. At other times, states drafted the militia to meet their own mili­
tary needs. Many of the Maryland militia who failed to defend the U.S. 
capital at the battle of Bladensburg, to give just one example, were 
conscripts.33 
A third plan that Monroe suggested, in the event that Congress 
refused to consider national conscription in any form, confirms the 
33The number of militia who served during the War of 1812 is difficult to 
ascertain. Upton’s  The Military Policy of the United States, p. 137, reports 
a total of nearly 450,000. However, this total not only includes troops who 
served at different times, but also duplications for the same individual b eing 
called into militia service more than once. Historical Statistics, vol. 2, p. 1135, 
estimates that a total of 286,730 different individuals served in state and U.S. 
forces during the War of 1812. Subtracting from that total the number of reg­
ulars and federal volunteers who served produces an estimate of 200,000. This 
conforms with the estimates in Weigley, History of the United States Army , 
p. 121. Also consult Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War, pp. 14–16. 
The Rules and Regulations of the Army for May 1, 1813, relating to mi­
litia drafts are  American State Papers: Military Affairs, vol. 1, pp. 425–38. 
For drafted militia at the Battle of Bladensburg, see Hill, The Minute Man 
in Peace and War, pp. 12–14, and Mahon, “The Citizen Soldier in National 
Defense,” pp. 420–35. It is interesting to note that the national government 
called for 5,000 militia from Pennsylvania before this battle, but the state re­
plied that, because of a legislative lapse, it was temporarily unable to employ 
conscription. Only a meager number of Pennsylvania volunteers showed up 
for the battle. 
Considerable confusion surrounded the legal length of the term of n a­
tional service for drafted militiamen during the War of 1812.  Militiamen 
often claimed that they were summoned under the Calling Forth Act for a 
three-month term, while the Madison administration claimed they were 
summoned under the 1812 Detachment Act (see note 32), for a six-month 
term. This dispute reached its most serious point when General Andrew 
Jackson, in February 1815, court-martialed and executed six militiamen 
who had the temerity to challenge too vociferously his decision about the 
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importance of these militia drafts. Men who could provide another to 
volunteer for the regular army would receive exemptions from state 
militia service. Congress eventually instituted this alternative method 
of bringing U.S. forces up to 100,000. Obviously, such exemptions 
would have been valueless if militia drafts had been rare or nonexis­
34tent.
Indeed, Monroe went so far as to argue that his first proposal, for 
conscription into the regular army, would be less coercive than the 
militia system itself. 
The organization of the militia is an act of public authority, 
not a voluntary association. The service required must be 
performed by all, under penalties, which delinquents 
pay. . . . 
The [conscription] plan proposed is not more compul­
sive than the militia service, while it is free from most of 
the objections to it. The militia service calls from home, 
for long terms, whole districts of the country. None can 
elude the call. Few can avoid the service; and those who 
do are compelled to pay great sums for substitutes.35 
Overall, for evading national service during the War of 1812, militia 
courts-martial fined nearly 10,000 men a total of $500,000. Still oth­
ers ignored purely state calls; New York, for example, assessed an 
additional $200,000 against 4,000 militia resistors. These numbers 
strikingly belie the common impression that militia drafts were nomi­
nal and unimportant. Only the awkward administrative dualism that 
divided responsibility between the state and national governments, 
coupled with increasing popular opposition to the militia, prevented 
34Act of December 10, 1814, 3 U.S. Statutes at Large 146. Monroe’s original 
plan called for five militia exemptions per regular volunteer, but the final act 
provided only one. It also incorporated Monroe’s fourth proposal, an increase 
in incentives for volunteering. The Federalists had earlier used national militia 
exemptions—in an amendment to the Provisional Army Act (June 22, 1798) 
1 U.S. Statutes at Large 569—to stimulate formation of volunteer units. The 
Republicans, in contrast, did not grant volunteer u nits  national exemptions 
from militia duty until the units were actually called into national service. 
As quoted in O’Sullivan and Meckler, The Draft and Its Enemies, p. 43. 
Monroe’s recommendations are also reprinted in Anderson, The Military 
Draft, pp. 503–13. We should note that Monroe’s second conscription plan, 
in addition to calling for a national militia draft, would have proscribed the 
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the full collection of national fines after the war had ceased. New York 
apparently collected the entire $200,000, but only at a monetary cost 
that exceeded that amount by $25,000.36 
In other words, the issue that Daniel Webster so eloquently de­
bated on the floor of the House of Representatives was not whether 
there should be conscription at all, but, rather, who should do the con­
scripting, states or the national government.37 The measures before 
Congress at the time were the Giles Bill, which had passed in the Sen­
ate, and the Troup Bill, which had been introduced in the House. The 
Giles Bill was a modified version of Monroe’s second conscription 
proposal, setting up a national system of militia classification and con­
scription to raise a force of 80,000 that would serve for two years. The 
Troup Bill modified Monroe’s first proposal, classified the population, 
and set quotas for the regular army, but did not authorize a draft. In­
stead, each class would meet its quota through taxes, proportional to 
wealth, that would be sufficiently high to pay for volunteers. Thus, the 
Troup Bill would have established a kind of primitive decentralized 
income tax to finance a volunteer army. It was an alternative to con­
scription that the militias of some states had tried during the Revolu­
tion. 
The House eventually passed its own version of the Giles Bill, 
but since the two houses could not resolve their differences, they in­
stead passed in January of 1815 an act allowing the national govern­
ment to accept up to 40,000 special troops organized by the states, 
plus any privately organized volunteer units that offered themselves, 
36White, The Jeffersonians, pp. 536–39, contains the only discussion that I 
have come across of the national fines arising out of militia drafts. Mahon’s 
History of the Militia, p. 81, mentions the additional New York state fines. 
Congress passed an act on February 2, 1813, 2 U.S. Statutes at Large 797, 
and a further special wartime measure on April 18, 1814, 3 U.S. Statutes at 
Large 134, both of which elaborated on the procedures for collecting the 
fines established in the Calling Forth Act. On the travail of the Quakers in 
their efforts to avoid militia conscription during the War of 1812, see Peter 
Brock’s monumental Pacifism in the United States: From the Colonial Era 
to the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 
pp. 339–42. 
37Webster’s speech was not published until The Letters of Daniel Webster: 
From Documents Owned Principally by the New Hampshire Historical Soci­
ety, ed. C.H. Van Tyne (New York: McClure, Phillips, 1902), pp. 56–68. It is 
reprint-ed in Anderson, The Military Draft , pp. 633–45, and O’Sullivan and 
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to serve for one year, with the total force not to exceed 80,000. Eight 
states, with New York at the fore, began creating special state forces. 
This usually involved modifying militia laws by adding a more ef­
fective system of state classification and conscription. Peace came, 
however, before these forces became fully operational, and the act 
of January 1815 was repealed.38 
This preoccupation with the centralization—as opposed to the 
extent—of power had already arisen in the war’s most rancorous and 
fateful militia controversy. The governors of Massachusetts and Con­
necticut and the legislature of Rhode Isla nd had refused at various 
times to furnish their state militias for national service, while a newly 
elected governor of Vermont had ordered his state militia to return 
home in the midst of a military campaign. Not until 1827 did the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in Martin v. Mott, finally settle this jurisdictional 
controversy by endorsing unchecked Presidential discretion in calling 
state militias into national service.39 
Less often cited, but equally significant, was the Supreme Court 
decision in Houston v. Moore seven years earlier. This virtually un­
known militia case actually yielded the first Court ruling on conscrip­
tion. It involved a Pennsylvania man who had been drafted into the 
militia during the War of 1812 in response to a Presidential call. When 
he evaded the draft, a Pennsylvania court fined him under the national 
Calling Forth Act. The draft resistor challenged the constitutionality of 
his punishment, arguing that because he had been drafted in response 
to a Presidential call, only a federal court could fine him. In effect, he 
denied that Congress had either the authority or the intention to estab­
lish a concurrent administration for militia drafts, in which the state 
governments assessed fines that the national government collected. 
The Court, however, disagreed and upheld the fine.40 
38Act of January 27, 1815, 3 U.S. Statutes at Large 193. 

39Henry Wheaton, Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme 

Court of the United States, 1816–1827 (Philadelphia: Matthew Carey, 1816– 

1827), vol. 12, pp. 19–40. Nearly every account of the War of 1812 refers to 
the controversy over calling out the New England militia, but for a concise 
summary, see White, The Jeffersonians, pp. 539–45. Massachusetts disavowed 
its action in 1824 in order to receive financial reimbursement from the nation­
al government for its wartime militia operations. 
40Wheaton, Reports of Cases Argued, vol. 5, pp. 1–76. The obvious re ason 
that legal scholars and historians have virtually ignored this case is that it ap­
plied only to the militia and said nothing either way about the national gov­




Hummel — The American Militia and the Origins of Conscription 
FROM THE WAR OF 1812 TO THE CIVIL WAR 
Meanwhile, nearly every subsequent President continued to sug­
gest militia reorganization in his annual messages. President Martin 
Van Buren’s Secretary of War, Joel R. Poinsett, made the last serious 
effort to nationalize the state militias in 1840.41 But all these sugges­
tions died from lack of interest. The national government relied for the 
most part upon a small regular army. Still, during the Second Seminole 
War (1835–1842)—the first protracted counter-insurgency campaign 
by the U.S.—large numbers of militia from various states supplement­
ed the regulars, and some of them from the Florida territory itself were 
drafted.42 
41Mahon, History of the Militia, p. 79, reports that between 1816 and 1835 the 
various Presidents requested militia reorganization from Congress no fewer 
than thirty-one times. For Congressional initiatives toward militia reorgani­
zation in the post-War of 1812 period, see Edgar Bruce Wesley, Guarding 
the Frontier: A Study of Frontier Defense from 1815 to 1825 (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1935), pp. 94–96. 
Poinsett’s militia plan is treated in Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians, pp. 
197–99, as well as in J. Fred Rippy, Joel R. Poinsett: Versatile American 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1935), pp. 175–77; James C. Curtis, 
The Fox at Bay: Martin Van Buren and the Presidency, 1837–1841 (Lexing­
ton: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), pp. 199–201; and Major L. Wilson, 
The Presidency of Martin Van Buren (Lawrence: University Press of Kan­
sas, 1984), pp. 188–89. The Whigs turned Poin sett’s militia plan politically 
against Van Buren to great effect during the 1840 Presidential race. 
Sometimes the term “militia reform” has been applied to these efforts to 
strengthen and centralize the common militia’s coercive features. The term, 
however, also refers to contrary movements at the state level, discussed b e­
low, to voluntarize the militia. For the sake of clarity, I have confined “mi­
litia reform” exclusively to the latter movement, and used the term “militia 
reorganization” to denote the nationalizing efforts. 
42To fight the Second Seminole War, the national government first called up 
the militia of the Florida territory and neighboring states. Later, in an act of 
May 23, 1836, 5 U.S. Statutes at Large 32, Congress authorized 10,000 six­
or t welve-month federal volunteers. It is not clear whether the territorial gov­
ernment of Florida initiated its militia draft in response to the n ational call or 
on its own. See John K. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War, 1835– 
1842 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967), pp. 139–40, 242; and 
George C. Bittle, “The Organized Florida Militia from 1821 to 1920” (Ph.D. 
diss., Florida State University, 1965), passim. 
Although the national government appears to have placed relatively great­
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Although the state governments continued to depend heavily upon 
their militias throughout the post-War of 1812 period, the entire mi­
litia system by this time was coming under sustained criticism at the 
catalog of all national mobilizations of state militias between the War of 1812 
and Civil War with which to confirm this observation systematically. Much 
less is there an exploration of whether such mobilizations involved militia 
drafts. Partial listings are in Mahon, History of the Militia, pp. 86–96; Coak­
ley, “Federal Use of Militia and National Guard in Civil Disturbances,” pp. 
25–26; and Rich, The Presidents and Civil Disorder, pp. 38–71. The most 
comprehensive compilation is Wilson, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturban­
ces, pp. 55–106. 
The national government supplemented regulars with militia to fight 
Indians not only in the Second Seminole War but also in the First Seminole 
War (1817–18) and the Black Hawk War (1831–12). During the somewhat 
misleadingly named First Seminole War, in which U.S. forces invaded Span­
ish Florida, General Andrew Jackson, on his own authority, raised more than 
1,000 federal volunteers from Tennessee and Kentucky, appoin ting their 
officers himself and ignoring the state governments. A Senate investigating 
committee later reprimanded him for this irregularity. A contingent of Geor­
gia militia that had been properly called into national service also partic ipa­
ted in this campaign, and it may or may not have been drafted by the state. 
Militia participating in the Black Hawk War seems to have been confined 
to mounted volunteers. 
Regulars imposed national authority without support of federalized mi­
litia (although milit ia under state control may have been present) during the 
slave revolts of 1831, the Bleeding Kansas episode (1856–58), the Mormon 
War (1857), and the Harpers Ferry Raid (1859). Small detachments of fed­
eralized militia assisted regulars in the Sabine border intrusion into Mexico 
(1836), in enforcement of neutrality during the Patriot insurrection in Can­
ada (1837–38), in removal of the Cherokee Indians (1838), and in enforcement 
of the fugitive slave laws (early 1850s). Probably none of these latter uses 
resulted in conscription. During the bloodless Aroostook War on the Canada-
Maine border, Congress passed an act on March 3, 1839, 5 U.S. Statutes at 
Large 355, authorizing the President to call out the militia for six months 
and to enlist 50,000 federal volunteers for six- to twelve-month terms, but 
President Van Buren did not put the act to use. 
Purely state calls upon the militia, while certainly more numerous, are 
even less well recounted. The two most significant were by South Carolina 
during the Nullification Crisis (1832) and by Maine during the Aroostook 
War (1838–39). The South Carolina call involved only volunteers, and I have 
been unable to find any indication either way about the Maine call. State mili­
tias were also involved in the Buckshot War in Pennsylvania (1838) and the 
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state level. Launching these political attacks was a collage of radical 
Jacksonians, peace advocates, and moralistic reformers. The Work­
ingmen’s Party in New York, precursor of the laissez-faire “Loco­
foco” Jacksonians, condemned militia fines because they fell unfairly 
upon laborers and the poor. The common militia also became the butt 
of an effective campaign of ridicule and civil disobedience. Men would 
muster for mandatory training with cornstalks, brooms, or other silly 
substitutes for weapons, giving rise to the derisive sobriquet “corn­
stalk militia.” In some locations, disgruntled militiamen would elect 
the town drunk their commander. As a result of these attacks, the com­
pulsory features of the common militia began to ease. 
Delaware became the first state to repeal some of its militia fines 
as early as 1816, and, in 1831, it abolished the common militia system 
altogether. Massachusetts eliminated all compulsory militia service 
in 1840, followed by Maine, Ohio, and Vermont in 1844, Connecticut 
and New York in 1846, Missouri in 1847, and New Hampshire in 
1851. New Jersey eliminated imprisonment for failure to pay a mili­
tia fine in 1844, followed by Iowa in 1846, Michigan in 1850, and 
California in 1856. In several states, fines were no longer enforced, 
or became truly nominal. Mandatory training days were already less 
frequent, and had degenerated into more social than military events.43 
43Practically the only study of the militia reform movement is Londen, “The 
Militia Fine.” Other sources, such as Paul T. Smith, “Militia in the United 
States from 1846 to 1860,” Indiana Magazine of History 15 (March 1919), 
pp. 20–47; Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians, pp. 186–92, 205–12; Mahon, 
History of the Militia, pp. 83–84; and Riker, Soldiers of the States, pp. 26–35, 
briefly recount the decline in the common militia or the legal changes at the 
state level that the militia reform movement brought about, but none look at 
this movement’s actual ideology or composition, which deserves greater at­
tention. 
On the continuing Quaker campaign of civil disobedience against the 
common militia, see Brock, Pacifism in the United States, pp. 342–50. The 
opposition of the New York Workingmen’s Party to compulsory militia duty is 
mentioned in Walter Hugins, Jacksonian Democracy and the Working Class: 
A Study of the New York Workingmen’s Movement, 1829–1837 (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 138–39. This radical Jacksonian 
advocacy of militia reform is consistent with Londen’s observation that o p­
position to militia fines and to debt imprisonment were closely united, since 
the radical Jacksonian Democrats also supported the elimination of the latter. 
However, this observation conflicts with the findings of Herbert Ershko­
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Only in the South were the compulsory features of the militia main­
tained, probably because of their vital connection with slave patrols.44 
A remarkable growth in the volunteer militia was concomitant 
with this decline in the common militia. Expanding steadily since the 
Revolution, the number of volunteer units exploded during the Jack­
sonian period. Three hundred sprang up in California between 1849 
and 1856. One out of every twenty-nine people in the District of Co­
lumbia belonged to a volunteer company. With this burgeoning mass 
appeal, the volunteer militia was no longer the preserve of a wealthy 
elite. As Russell Weigley noted in his eminent history of the U.S. Army, 
units such as “[t]he New England Guards of Boston, the 7th Regiment 
of New York ‘National Guards,’ the First Troop of the Philadelphia 
City Cavalry, the Light Infantry Blues of Richmond, [and] the Wash­
ington Artillery of New Orleans” were popular and colorful “fixtures 
in the State Legislatures During the Jacksonian Era,” Journal of American 
History 58 (December 1971), pp. 591–621, reprinted in The Many-Faceted 
Jacksonian Era: New Interpretations, ed. Edward Pessen (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1977), pp. 212–41. Based on a quantitative voting analysis 
of four state legislatures, Ershkowitz and Shade find that while Democrats 
supported debt reform more strongly than did Whigs, militia reform crossed 
party lines. 
44The relationship between the common militia and the compulsory slave 
patrol in the South is difficult to pin down because little has been written about 
the latter. Among the most illuminating exceptions are John Anthony Scott, 
“Segregation: A Fundamental Aspect of Southern Race Relations, 1800–1860,” 
Journal of the Early Republic 4 (Winter 1984), pp. 421–42, and John Hope 
Franklin, The Militant South, 1800–1861 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1956), 
pp. 72–76. Franklin, on pp. 171–92, also discusses the Southern militia system. 
When scholars do consider the slave patrol, they are understandably more 
concern ed with its impact on the slaves than on free whites. Nonetheless, this 
scholarly gap is doubly unfortunate, because the compulsory slave patrol was 
one way that slave owners socialized the costs of maintaining the slave system, 
thereby distorting the economic calculation of those costs and transferring them 
to non-owners. The operation of the compulsory slave patrol thus has enor­
mous implications for the controversies about slavery’s economic efficiency. 
George Fitzhugh, a perceptive arch-apologist for s lavery, was acutely 
aware of this critical relationship. In  Sociology for the South: Or the Failure 
of Free Society (Richmond, Virg.: A Morris, 1854), pp. 144–45, he proclaim­
ed: “The poor . . . constitute our militia and our police. They protect men in 
the possession of property, as in other countries; and do much more, they 
secure men in possession of a kind of property which could not hold a day 




Hummel — The American Militia and the Origins of Conscription 
of the American scene.” Even in the South, the volunteer militia came 
to supplant the common militia in size and importance.45 
The supplanting was so thorough that some historians call the vol­
unteer component of the pre-Civil War militia the organized militia 
while designating the common component the enrolled militia. In prior 
periods, of course, organized units had come from both the common 
and volunteer militia. In short, the Jacksonian era witnessed nearly 
total transformation of the militia from a compulsory to a voluntary 
system. Because many volunteer units were privately organized, re­
cruited, and equipped, the militia became a partially privatized system 
as well. A third terminological variation clearly reflects this last trait: 
the volunteer militia became popularly known as the uniformed 
militia. States rarely provided uniforms to any militia units, so volun­
teer units purchased their own. 
Many military historians have unfairly characterized the transfor­
mation to voluntarism as “the decay” of the militia .46 Because of this 
so-called decay, the Mexican War became the first in U.S. history to 
be fought solely with volunteers. A remnant of the common militia 
survived, and Congress gave President James K. Polk the power to call 
the militia into national service for six months rather than the three 
months specified in the Calling Forth Act. Early in the war, General 
Edmund Gaines, commanding at New Orleans, made an unauthorized 
call for militia from the Southwestern states, and Louisiana’s governor 
threatened a draft in order to raise his state’s allotment. But the Polk 
administration quickly relieved Gaines and canceled his call.47 
45Weigley, History of the United States Army , p. 157. The flourishing of vol­
unteer militia is covered in Mahon, “The Citizen Soldier in National Defense,” 
pp. 189–201 ff.; Mahon, The American Militia: Decade of Decision, pp. 56– 
61; Mahon, History of the Militia, pp. 84–87; Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians, 
pp. 213–54; and Todd, “Our National Guard.” 
46Thus, Riker, Soldiers of the States, titles his third chapter “Degeneration of 
the Militia, 1792–1860”; Mahon, History of the Militia, titles his sixth chapter 
“Decline of the Militia: Rise of the Volunteers”; and Cunliffe, Soldiers and 
Civilians, has a sub-chapter on “The Militia in Decline.” In contrast, John K. 
Mahon, “A Board of Officers Considers the Condition of the Militia in 1826,” 
Military Affairs 15 (Summer 1951), pp. 85–94, reports that a War Department 
board that investigated the militia discovered that, even before the disappear­
ance of the common militia, most experts believed the volunteer militia to be 
superior. 
47An act of May 13, 1846, 9 U.S. Statutes at Large 9, recognized a state of 
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Therefore, Polk could justifiably boast that in, waging the Mexi­
can War, 
Unlike what would have occurred in any other country, 
we were under no necessity of resorting to drafts or con­
scriptions. On the contrary, such was the number of vol­
unteers who patriotically tendered their services that the 
chief difficulty was in . . . determining who should be 
compelled to remain at home.48 
Equally significant, the 60,931 federal volunteers, many from volunteer 
militia units, who served alongside the 42,374 U.S. regulars, displayed 
none of the previous military ineptitude of the drafted common militia. 
Whatever their other shortcomings, they won nearly all their engage­
ments, although usually outnumbered.49 
UNION AND CONFEDERACY DURING THE CIVILWAR 
The volunteer militia was so vibrant at the beginning of the Civil 
War that it brought to each side an enthusiastic influx of units—more 
units, in fact, than either could process. Civil War historian Kenneth 
P. Williams has observed that, within four months of the firing on 
Fort Sumter, the Union army multiplied by an astonishing factor of 
twenty-seven despite the defection of nearly half the country and of 
many professional officers. That sharply contrasts with the army’s 
out the militia to serve for six months, and authorized the recruitment of 50,000 
volunteers to serve for one year or the duration of the war. 
On the unauthorized militia call by General Gaines, see K. Jack Bauer, 
The Mexican War, 1846–1848 (New York: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 57–58; 
Kreidberg and Henry, History of the Military Mobilization, pp. 74–75; and 
Weigley, History of the United States Army , p. 183. Only Bauer, however, 
in his volume from the Macmillan Wars of the United States series, mentions 
the threatened Louisiana draft. General Zachary Taylor also made an earlier 
call, this one authorized, upon the common militia of Texas and Louisiana, 
when hostilities were impending, but I have uncovered no mention of any 
resulting draft. All 12,000 of the common militia that turned out as a result 
of both Taylor’s and Gaines’s calls were demobilized without seeing action. 
Otherwise, the national government relied on recruiting regulars and federal 
volunteers. 
As quoted in Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians, p. 204. 
49See, for instance, Bauer, The Mexican War, passim. The most judicious 
summary of the relative merits of regulars and volunteers in the Mexican War 
is Weigley, History of the United States Army , pp. 173–89. The numbers of 
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mere threefold growth, under a rigid system of conscription, during 
the four months at the beginning of the U.S. entry into World War I. 
It is doubtful that the Confederacy, which had to turn away as many 
as 200,000 volunteers during the Civil War’s first year, could have 
so quickly mobilized a major army from scratch without the founda­
tion provided by the volunteer militia.50 
The tradition of the common militia was not dead, however. It 
was responsible for exemption fees and substitute hiring in both the 
Confederate and Union conscription systems. As pointed out above, 
the Southern states had never repealed their compulsory militia laws. 
As a result, before the Confederate Congress passed a conscription act 
in April 1862, some of them independently drafted soldiers to meet 
their manpower quotas.51 
50Following Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, pp. 227–47, 
most military historians—especially Fred A. Shannon, The Organization 
and Administration of the Union Army  (Cleveland, Ohio: Arthur H. Clark, 
1928), vol. 1, pp. 15–52; and A. Howard Meneely, The War Department, 
1861: A Study in Mobilization and Administration (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1928)—have denigrated the initial Union mobilization of 
manpower. Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Finds a Ge neral: A Military Study 
of the Civil War (New York: Macmillan, 1949–59), vol. 1, pp. 60–66, 114–48, 
and vol. 2, pp. 796–98, first corrected this misleading impression. His compari­
son of Civil War and World War I mobilization appears in vol. 1, pp. 120–1. 
See also Weigley, History of the United States Army , pp. 197–201, and Kreid­
berg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, pp. 83–103. 
There is woefully little on the creation of the Confe derate army. Nearly 
the only treatments of any substance are Kreidberg and Henry, History of 
Military Mobilization, pp. 129–37; Albert Burton Moore, Conscription and 
Conflict in the Confederacy (New York: Macmillan, 1924), pp. 1–11; William 
C. Harris, Leroy Pope Walker: Confederate Secretary of War (Tuscaloosa, 
Ala.: Confederate Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 56–71; William L. Shaw, 
“The Confederate Conscription and Exemption Acts,” American Journal of 
Legal History 6 (October 1962), pp. 368–405; and E. Merton Coulter, The 
Confederate States of America, 1861–1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1966), pp. 308–13. 
51The initial Confederate conscription act of April 1862 permitted the hiring 
of substitutes, but this provision was repealed in December 1863. Only con­
scientious objectors could pay a $500 exemption fee, and only if they were 
Quakers, Dunkers, or Mennonites as of October 1862. 
The standard account of Confederate conscription is Moore, Conscrip­
tion and Conflict in the Confederacy. Moore, however, does not investigate 
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Similarly, the first Union conscription law, passed in July of 1862, 
was only a modification of the old Calling Forth Act. It empowered the 
President to call out the militia for nine instead of three months, and, if 
the states failed to meet national quotas, authorized him to administer 
militia drafts directly, as Monroe’s second conscription plan had re­
quested during the War of 1812. Not until March of 1863 did Congress 
adopt a national conscription law similar to that of the Confederacy.52 
would have escaped historical notice entirely but for the intriguing contra­
diction posed by Governor Joseph E. Brown of Georgia, who resisted and 
bitterly denounced the central government’s conscription act, but had ear­
lier, on his own authority, conscripted men into the state forces. See Louise 
Biles Hill, Joseph E. Brown and the Confederacy (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1939), p. 80; Curtis Arthur Amlund, Federalism in 
the Southern Confederacy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966), 
p. 96; W. Buck Yearns, The Confederate Governors (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1985), pp. 174–75, 201. William L. Shaw, “Conscription by 
the State through the Time of the Civil War,” Judge Advocate Journal 34 
(October 1962), pp. 33–36, gives a detailed case study of state conscription 
in Civil War Louisiana. 
The Confederate draft, unlike the Union draft, but like modern conscrip­
tion, had occupational exemptions, such as the exemption of one white man 
on each plantation of twenty or more slaves. The Confederate government 
pursued an active policy of economic intervention into the labor market by 
manipulating these exemptions. In February 1864, the Confederate Congress 
abolished all industrial exemptions and replaced them with the direct detail­
ing of conscripted soldiers to industry. The inexorable logic of military con­
scription had led the nation of black agricultural slavery to the ironic but 
appropriate adoption of white industrial sla very. 
52The Union Militia Act of July 17, 1862 is 12 U.S. Statutes at Large 597. 
The Union’s national conscription act, or Enrollment Act, of March 3, 1863, 
is 12 U.S. Statutes at Large 731. It provided both for hiring substitutes and 
for a $300 commutation fee. An amendment of February 24, 1864, 13 U.S. 
Statutes at Large 6, provided that paying the fee bought exemption only from 
a specific call, not from subsequent calls. It also limited exemptions through 
substitutes. If the substitute was not subject to the draft himself, the duration 
of the exemption extended for as long as the substitute was in service. How­
ever, substitutes who were subject to the draft provided their purchaser only 
with an exemption from the current call. Congress on July 4, 1864, 13 U.S. 
Statutes at Large 379, abolished commutation except for conscientious ob­
jectors. Congress again amended the draft law on March 3, 1865, 13 U.S. 
Statutes at Large 509, but by then the war was all but over. 
Accounts of Union conscription include the second part of Leach, Con­
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(At least two Northern states, New York and Massachusetts, tempo­
rarily reimposed a compulsory militia system during the war.53) 
AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 
The Civil War triumph of national conscription eliminated the 
militia’s raison d’être. In the years after Appomattox, all the states 
finally buried the common militia. Even the volunteer militia was 
slow to revive. The peacetime enrollment of volunteer units never 
approached its pre-war per capita  level. As an isolated elite of pro­
fessionals came again to dominate membership in the organized mi­
litia, its connection with government at all levels became increasingly 
intimate. State governments assumed ever-greater responsibility for 
organizing, recruiting, and equipping the units, inspired partially by 
the desire for a reliable force to break labor strikes. 
A general effort to more closely identify the organized militia with 
the national government caused most states to emulate New York in 
borrowing the French term “National Guard.” Militia officers from 
around the nation in 1877 organized the National Guard Association, a 
pressure group to lobby for larger state and national appropriations.54 
second volume of Shannon, The Organization and Administration of the Union 
Army; Shaw, “The Civil War Federal Conscription and Exemption Sy stem”; 
Murdock, Patriotism Limited, 1862–1865; and Eugene C. Murdock, One 
Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North (Madison: State His torical 
Society of Wisconsin, 1971). Good summary treatments, most of which also 
touch upon the Confederacy, are Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military 
Mobilization, pp. 83–113, 129–37; Cotton M. Lindsay, “Our National Tra­
dition of Conscription: Experience with the Draft,” in Why The Draft? The 
Case for a Volunteer Army , edited by James C. Miller, III (Baltimore: Penguin, 
1968), pp. 124–37; O’Sullivan and Meckler, The Draft and Its Enemies, pp. 
53–101; Rafuse, “United States’ Experience with Volunteer and Conscript 
Forces,” 14–19; and Weigley, History of the United States Army , pp. 197–211. 
53Robert S. Chamberlain, “The Northern State Militia,” Civil War History 4 
(June 1958), pp. 105–18, and Shaw, “Conscription by the State,” pp. 37–39. 
54Post-Civil War militia history is well covered in Hill, The Minute Man in 
Peace and War, pp. 99–138; Mahon, History of the Militia, pp. 108–24; and 
Riker, Soldiers of the States, pp. 41–66. Riker attaches special importance 
to the National Guard’s strike-breaking role, whereas Hill almost totally 
discounts it. One limited and temporary reversal in the militia’s post-Civil 
War decline was the attempt by Southern Reconstruction governments to 
recruit former slaves into a volunteer militia. See Otis A. Singletary, Negro 
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Finally, in the wake of the Spanish-American War, Congress 
passed the Dick Act of 1902. Along with supplementary legislation, 
the Dick Act brought to final realization Washington’s and Knox’s 
old dream of a federally trained, controlled, and funded militia. The 
volunteer militia, which already had been de-privatized, was now 
fully nationalized. The only missing component of Knox’s original 
scheme was conscription. The Dick Act did restate the principle of 
universal obligation in establishing what it called the Reserve Militia , 
but this was primarily a pro-forma vestige from the Federalist Uniform 
Militia Act. The Dick Act’s substance applied to the wholly voluntary 
“organized militia, to be known as the National Guard.”55 
CONCLUSION 
The birth of modern mass conscription has usually been attributed 
to the French Revolution. Napoleon’s citizen armies first demonstrated 
the devastating potential of the levee en masse. But close examination 
of the traditional militia concept reveals that it had embraced the under­
lying ideal of universal obligation well before the revolution in France. 
The militia, therefore, become an important historical antecedent to 
the French creation of a nation at arms. The early years of the Ameri­
can Republic turn out to corroborate, rather than contradict, the gen­
eral historical affinity between mass participation in government and 
mass participation in warfare, between democracy and conscription.56 
Martha Derthick’s history of the National Guard Association, The Na­
tional Guard in Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 
is, unfortunately, somewhat sparse on the Association’s founding and early 
years. Another National Guard pressure group, founded eight years earlier 
(1871), was the National Rifle Association. It originally attempted to draw the 
Guard and the regular army closer together with organized rifle competitions. 
55Act of January 21, 1903, 32 U.S. Statutes at Large 775. 
56The classic account of the relationship between conscription and demo c­
racy is Hoffman Nickerson, The Armed Horde 1793–1939: A Study of the 
Rise, Survival, and Decline of the Mass Army  (New York: G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1940). James M. McConnell, “European Experience with Volunteer 
and Conscript Forces,” in  Studies Prepared for the President’s Commission 
on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1970), vol. 2, offers a survey of the history of conscription 
in France, Germany, and Britain. A more recent scholarly examination of 
the French creation of the “armed horde,” which adds some qualifications 
to the classic account, is Geoffrey Best, War and S ociety in Revolutionary 
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Conscription not only was inherent in the traditional militia system, 
but may also have been the hidden factor behind that system’s ill re­
pute. The contrast in military competence between the U.S. citizen 
soldiers who fought in the War of 1812 and those who fought in the 
Mexican War is so striking that it has escaped the notice of few ob­
servers. Yet, most do not realize that, in the years between those two 
wars, the militia  system underwent a dramatic transformation from 
compulsion to voluntarism, and none has drawn the obvious causal 
inference. On the contrary, American military theorists, starting with 
Washington and Knox and moving on to those of the present, have 
used the traditional militia’s weaknesses to justify far more extensive 
conscription and universal military training. Ironically, they have sought 
more of the very feature that may have been responsible for the mili­
tia’s poor military performance in the first pla ce. 
If libertarians wish to look to the past for guidelines about a free 
society’s ideal defense, they must pass over the traditional militia sys­
tem. Despite its appealing decentralist rhetoric and its close ties with 
the American Revolution, it was from the very core a coercive system, 
one clearly inimical to liberty. Instead, they should cast their eyes upon 
the volunteer militia of the Jacksonian period. Although maligned by 
military historians, forgotten by all others, and corrupted by post-
Civil War statism, it is the one military precedent that most closely 
embodies libertarian precepts. 
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